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This book is the English version of a work 
which appeared two years ago in Portuguese.
1
 Its 
structure and general aim are clearly outlined
2.
 I will 
give a brief sketch of them before moving to more 
general issues. The volume consists of four chapters. 
The first two have a methodological character, and 
deal with the history of modern scholarship on 
Pythagoreanism and Pythagoreanism as an historio-
graphical category respectively. Chapters three and 
four have a more specific character, being focused on 
two fundamental doctrines of Pythagoreanism such 
as metempsychosis and arithmology. The interplay 
between these different aspects, that is on the one 
hand methodology, on the other the discussion 
of sources, is a main feature of the book. Equally 
noteworthy are the range of ancient and modern ma-
terials examined, the variety of scholarly approaches 
surveyed, and the original insights provided on 
different topics.
The author’s main claim is that Pythagore-
anism cannot be understood by the conventional 
means of scientific investigation. Pythagoreanism 
is a phenomenon sui generis; it requires therefore a 
methodology which must also be sui generis. First of 
all, it is a phenomenon which is not limited in time, 
as Pythagorean tradition never died.
3
 Secondly, it 
is a multi-faceted phenomenon which cannot be 
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studied without taking into account its complexity 
and its contradictions. Last but not least, even the 
definition of “Pythagoreanism” is a problem: every 
scholar has more or less his own view of what is 
“Pythagorean” and what is not, of what belongs 
to the tradition going back to Pythagoras and his 
immediate followers and what has been added to 
it later. 
As the author puts it, the uniqueness of 
Pythagoreanism depends on the fact that this phe-
nomenon is both diachronic and synchronic. It is 
diachronic because it can be understood only if one 
deals with the different strata of its tradition. Every 
stage of Pythagoreanism is a construction (or even 
a re-construction) whose reliability depends both on 
the trustfulness of the elements which constitute 
it and the soundness of the methodological criteria 
applied. Since the times of August Boeckh,
4
 scholars 
have been analyzing these elements trying to sort 
out doxographical trees of succession which would 
enable to grasp fragments of lost texts of Pythago-
reanism. This task has been accomplished by study-
ing late authors such as Porphyry and Iamblichus, 
whose accounts turned out to rely on earlier texts 
such as those of Aristotle and his followers. But 
however successful (or unsuccessful) these studies 
have been,
5
 other problems arose from them. The 
data made available by Quellenforschung showed that 
Pythagoreanism had always been a multifaceted as 
well as an extremely controversial movement, and 
that reconstructing its tradition from Neoplatonism 
up Aristotle and Plato could not help in explain-
ing its inconsistencies. On the contrary, the more 
“original” testimonies emerged from Hellenistic and 
Roman literature the more it became evident that 
Pythagoreanism was characterized by two apparently 
incompatible strands of knowledge, i.e. the “mysti-
cal” one of acousmata and metempsychosis and 
the “scientific” one of cosmology and mathematics.
Cornelli gives full account of the interpreta-
tions which led to this impasse. His scrutiny of 
Pythagorean scholarship is both exhaustive and 
stimulating. The different hermeneutic approaches 
to Pythagorean literature make clear that a purely 
diachronic approach to the historical development 
of tradition is not sufficient to grasp its uniqueness. 
Cornelli suggests therefore to combine this approach 
with another one, which he calls «synchronic». As he 
puts it, «to synchronically understand Pythagorean-
ism is to recognize its place within the categories 
ordinarily used to describe ancient philosophy», 
namely: «“pre-Socratic”, “school”, “science”, “reli-
gion”, “politics”, or even “philosophy”» (54). But 
as none of these standard categories is multifaceted 
enough to apply to Pythagoreanism, an adjust-
ment in methodology becomes necessary. A truly 
synchronic understanding of Pythagoreanism must 
be multidisciplinary, in order to overcome «the 
dichotomies between science and magic, writing 
and orality, Ionians and Italics, to which historiog-
raphy usually appeals» (55). Such an approach had 
already been attempted by Walter Burkert, who in 
his seminal book of 1972 pointed out the necessity 
to have a treatment of Pythagoreanism as «many-
sided as possible».
6
 Cornelli follows this path, but 
goes further. He claims that if Pythagorean wisdom 
is polymathy, as Heracleitus puts it (fr. 22 B 40 and 
129 DK), the study of it must suit its nature, and 
thus turn into a «methodological polymathy» (54). 
This leads Cornelli to claim that Pythagoreanism 
itself must be considerated as an historiographical 
category. It does not fall under the “conventional” 
categories of Presocratic philosophy such as religion, 
politics and science, but encompasses them all.
Cornelli’s aim is ambitious: he maintains that 
one has to understand Pythagoreanism not through 
already existing categories, but as a category on its 
own. This «will permit Pythagoreanism to emerge 
from the mists of its complex history» (54), and in 
turn enable to get a better understanding of other 
categories of ancient philosophy. Such a methodol-
ogy may even be of great impact outside the field of 
Pythagoreanism, as it will likely have consequences 
also for the study of the pre-Socratics in general.
7
 
One may wonder whether such an holistic ap-
proach, which aims at eliminating barriers between 
disciplines, is altogether possible, given the ultra-
specialized character of contemporary scholarship. 
Another problem concerns the subjects of research 
which characterize Pythagoreanism. These appear 
to be fundamentally heterogeneous: on the one 
hand science, on the other religion: can we cope 
3. 53: «Rather, the proposed 
methodology aims to understand 
how, through the intertwining 
of diachronic and synchronic 
dimensions, the category of 
“Pythagoreanism” survived 
the expected dilution of a 
multifaceted movement, a 
movement that is not only 
radically and extensively diverse 
in its authors and subjects, but 
that additionally spans over a 
thousand years of the history of 
Western thought. In fact, the 
unique challenge of this project 
among to the problems associated 
with the history of pre-Socratic 
philosophy lies in the fact that 
Pythagoreanism has properly 
never died».
4.A. Boeckh, Philolaos des 
Pythagoreers Lehren nebst den 
Bruchstücken seines Werkes, 
Vossische Buchhandlung, Berlin 
1819.
5. Seminal Quellenforschung in 
Pythagoreanism has been done 
since the last decades of 1800. 
See E. Zeller, E. Rohde, Die Quellen 
des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie 
des Pythagoras, Rheinisches 
Museum für Philologie 26 
(1871), 554-576; J. Mewaldt, De 
Aristoxeni Pythagoricis sententiis 
et Vita Pythagorica, Dissertation 
Berlin 1904; W. Bertermann, 
De Iamblichi vitae Pythagoricae 
fontibus, Dissertation Königsberg 
1913; A. Delatte, Études sur 
la littérature pythagoricienne, 
Slatkine & Fils, Paris 1915, Essai 
sur la politique pythagoricienne, 
Slatkine & Fils, Paris 1922, La vie 
de Pythagore de Diogène Laërce, 
Lamertin, Bruxelles 1922; H. 
Jäger, Die Quellen des Porphyrios 
in seiner Pythagoras-Biographie, 
Dissertation Zürich 1919; I. Lévy, 
Recherches sur les sources de la 
legend de Pythagore, Leroux, Paris 
1927; A.-J. Festugière, Sur la ‘Vita 
Pythagorica’ de Jamblique, Revue 
des études grecques 50 (1937), 
470-484; K. von Fritz, Pythagorean 
Politics in Southern Italy. An 
Analysis of the Sources, Columbia 
University Press, New York 1940 
and ‘Pythagoras’, RE 47, 1963, 
171-203; W. Burkert, Lore and 
Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, 
Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1972, esp. 53-83 
and 97-109. The achievements 
reached by these scholars 
have been recently doubted by 
Leonid Zhmud, who claims that 
«attempts to reconstruct authentic 
Pythagorean texts from the fifth 
and fourth centuries brought to no
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 result», and that
«perhaps because of the absence 
of palpable success in this area 
of Quellenforschung, in recent 
decades very few scholars have 
ventured far into it» (Pythagoras 
and the Early Pythagoreans, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2012, 
9-10). Despite Zhmud’s skepticism, 
many scholars do nowadays still 
believe that later authors (such 
as Iamblichus) use sources going 
back to texts of the 5th and 4th 
centuries (such as Aristotle’s works 
on Pythagoreanism). A recent 
work going in this direction is P.S. 
Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2013, esp. 85-88. 
  
6.W. Burkert, Lore and 
Science, 12: «Most studies of 
Pythagoreanism have dealt with 
only one restricted aspect; even 
Zeller confined himself to the 
development of philosophical 
concepts, left mathematics aside, 
and bracketed out religious and 
ethical questions; and later works 
have been even more specialized, 
whether in the philosophical 
area, in that of mathematical, 
astronomical, and musical 
problems, or that of religion». 
This approach has been severely 
criticized by Leonid Zhmud, who 
thinks that Pythagoreanism can 
be studied only by sorting out 
single issues «which may prove 
amenable to solution» (L. Zhmud, 
Pythagoras, 12; on this issue see 
also Zhmud’s latest paper On the 
Fallacy of the Holistic Approach to 
Pythagoreanism, held in Berlin on 
October 20, 2013 at the workshop 
“Pythagorean Harmonics from 
Philolaus to Leibniz”).
  
7. Thanks to its complexity, 
Cornelli’s Pythagoreanism 
turns out to be a paradigmatic 
hermeneutic category which 
forces to overcome the traditional 
boundaries that characterize 
the study of ancient thought 
and culture: «In the case of 
Pythagoreanism, it will be 
necessary to overcome the rigid 
dichotomies of a historiography 
too accustomed to distinguish, 
for example, between sciene and 
magic, writing and orality, Ionian 
and Italian. None of these alone 
seems to capture the complexity 
of Pythagorean social organization 
and doctrine» (55).
with such diverse topics using one single approach? 
Cornelli’s book leaves many questions open: only 
time will tell if its ideas will be able to convert into 
reality. One thing is certain: a holistic approach to 
Pythagoreanism may be difficult if not altogether 
impossible to attain. But even more so, there is no 
doubt that such an approach represents a highly 
wished desideratum in scholarship, where compart-
mentalization of the different facets of Pythagorean 
knowledge has become more and more increasing, 
thus making it difficult to study the context of their 
origins, development, and interdependency.
But  Pythagoreanism is not only an historio-
graphical category. Cornelli goes further this categori-
zation, and tackles key-issues linked to it, namely the 
definition of Pythagoreanism and the criterion for being 
Pythagorean.
8
 To answer these questions, he focuses 
on three distinct strands of Pythagorean tradition, 
namely: way of life as attested in the akousmata and 
symbola, immortality and transmigration of the soul, 
and numerology. Cornelli’s idea is that all of these 
forms of knowledge, though different, go back to 
“Proto-pythagoreanism”,
9
 that is to the most ancient 
stage of this philosophical movement, and that they 
remained a distinct feature of Pythagoreanism also in 
later ages. In two distinct chapters he deals in detail 
with these topics (chapter 3, on metempsychosis; 
chapter 4, on numbers), which showcase how varied 
and multifaceted Pythagoreanism is. Here we learn, 
among other things, that Pythagoreanism appears to 
be «both mystical and scientific, because on the one 
hand, the theory of metempsychōsis does not respond 
only to a soteriological mystique, but also becomes 
an explanatory element of a reality that is irreducibly 
interconnected, as well as being the foundation of 
epistemology in the practice of anámnēsis» (192).
One might think that in Cornelli’s view the 
definition of Pythagorean identity is a complex 
one, similar to that of Pythagoreanism as an his-
toriographical category. But this is not the case, 
as for Cornelli the criterion for being Pythagorean 
is «membership in a community and a shared bíos 
consisting primarily in observing Pythagorean 
akoúsmata and symbola, rather than the acceptance 
of certain philosophical and scientific theories» 
(82). This means that if on one hand there is no 
contradiction between the acousmatic and the 
mathematical Pythagoreanism, on the other there 
is no doubt that the acousmatic moment is deci-
sive: not science but way of life and belonging to 
a Pythagorean koinonia
10
 is the ultimate criterion 
for identifying a Pythagorean.
11
So we see: the concern of an historiographical 
Pythagoreanism which encompasses the contrasts 
and differences of tradition does not impede the 
author to provide the distinctive feature of what is 
specifically Pythagorean and what is not. A major 
achievement of the book lies in the productivity of 
this ambivalence: very different figures of tradition 
like Philolaus and Apollonius turn out to be similar 
as soon as their adherence to a special lifestyle and 
a community comes to the fore. We can therefore 
conclude that Cornelli’s Pythagoreanism is not just a 
“historiographical category”, as it has to do not with 
the doctrines, but with the lives of its protagonists. 
It is a category in flesh and blood, which cannot 
be separated from the charismatic manners and 
attitudes of the representatives of Pythagoreanism 
in its different historical stages.
Recebido em maio de 2014,
aprovado em junho de 2014.
8. In Cornelli’s view, the criteria which are commonly used for defining “what 
is Pythagorean” are not sufficient: «The criteria commonly used to classify 
someone as a Pythagorean did not seem to stand up to our methodological test: 
because one cannot think of the Pythagorean school as something doctrinally 
homogeneous. Further, neither geographical criteria nor doxographical trees of 
succession serve as adequate ways to define the category» (84).
9. The term “Proto-Pythagoreanism” is not new in scholarship: see, e.g., G. de 
Santillana & H. von Dechend, Hamlet’s Mill. An Essay on Myth and the Frame of 
Time, Gambit, Boston 1969. New is the systematical use of it Cornelli makes in 
his book (5-6, 42-44, 49, 51, 60-61, 73, 84-85, 87, 91, 94, 97-99, 119, 126, 
132, 134, 135, 137, 144, 145, 147, 185, 188, 190, 192, 194).    
10. The issue of Pythagorean koinonia is debated at pages 67-77 of the 
volume. To define the specific character of Pythagorean “clubs” Cornelli opts 
for the neutral term koinonia, thus rejecting other definitions such as “sect” 
(Rohde, Burkert, Riedweg) and “church” (Toynbee, Jaeger). On this and related 
issues see also G. Cornelli, Sulla vita filosofica in comune: koinonía e philía 
pitagoriche, in: S. Giombini & F. Marcacci (eds.), Il quinto secolo. Studi di 
filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti, Aguaplano, Perugia 2010, 415-436.
 
11. In Cornelli’s view, these two aspects are linked: «However, the possibility 
of adherence to a particular way of life implies, at least in its inaugural 
pre-Socratic times, the actual existence of a community that is structured 
around that same way of life» (59). Bruno Centrone (Review of Zhmud, 
Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im frühen Pythagoreismus, Elenchos 
20 (1999), 441) and Carl Huffman (Two Problems in Pythagoreanism, in P. 
Curd & D.W. Graham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to Presocratic Philosophy, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, 301) have similar claims, but they do 
not connect these two aspects.
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